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Mass tort litigation has strained the judicial process to the point where
finding alternative means of dispute resolution (ADR) is essential. Judges
and lawyers have come up with a number of innovative solutions to
resolving the onslaught of civil suits, and commentators have tried to
analyze their efforts by comparing them to traditional ADR mechanisms. 1
Much of this analysis makes little sense, however, without recognizing that
the actions of those involved in the mass tort arena are controlled as much
by procedural limitations as by the nature of the matter in dispute. While
the sheer volume of claims and the large sums of money involved encourage
aggregating claims and mediating settlement agreements rather than
litigating individual actions, courts' efforts are skewed by the limited
procedural mechanisms available to them.
This Note examines the two largest hurdles judges and litigants face in
dealing with mass tort disputes-the Anti-Injunction Act2 and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal
injunctions of state court proceedings; thus, a court cannot consolidate all
state and federal tort claims in one proceeding. Part Two of this Note
examines how the decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States
might allow an exception to the Act in aid of a federal court's jurisdiction in
approving a settlement agreement. Part Three looks at the problems
associated with certifying a mandatory class under Rules 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2)
or 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 The Due Process Clause
I See Deborah R. Hensler, Symposiun: National Mass Ton Conference, A Glass Half
Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REy. 1587, 1619-1620 (1995).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 no relevant sections of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to
class action disputes read as follows:
(b) CLASS AcTIoNs MAINTAINABLE. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
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(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court rinds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
(c) DETERMINATION BY ORDER WHETHER CLASS ACTION TO BE MAINTAINED; NOTICE;
JUDGMENT; ACTIONS CONDUCTED PARTIALLY AS CLASS ACTIONS.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An
order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision ()(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each members that (A) the court will
exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion, may, if
the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(l)
or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided
in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment may prohibit a court from determining the
rights of an individual who has not been given the opportunity to opt out of
an action. In short, courts must address certain procedural limitations before
adjudicating mass tort disputes either through traditional or alternative
dispute resolution methods.
II. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
A. Pre-1948 Exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act
The All-Writs Act5 authorizes a court to "issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 6 The Anti-Injunction Act,7 originally passed
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1793, directs federal courts to respect the
sovereignty of state courts. The Act provides that a "court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court." 8
Federal courts have construed the two acts jointly as providing a basis for
injunctions against state court proceedings.
9
Although a federal court's power to stay state court actions is
discretionary, courts have traditionally viewed the Anti-Injunction Act as a
bar to the issuance of an injunction.10 There is little historical basis for a
narrow interpretation of the Act, however, because there is no record of
why the Act passed. 11
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.
FED. R. Clv. P. 23.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
6 Id. § 1651(a).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
8Id.
9 See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1993); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993). cell. denied, 510
U.S. 1140 (1994); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5142, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16,1 991), aff'd nzem., 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991).
l0 See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4222
(1988).
11 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 (1972) ("The history of this provision in
the Judiciary Act of 1793 is not fully known.") (quoting American State Papers, Misc., vol.
1, No. 17, pp. 21-36); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
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In Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,12 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the Anti-Injunction Act as recognizing the concurrent
jurisdiction of state and federal courts. 13 In that case, a construction
company brought suit for breach of contract in federal court, and the
defendants subsequently filed an action in state court.14 The federal district
court refused to grant an injunction against the state proceeding, but the
appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's
ruling, stating "where the action first brought is in personam and seeks only
a personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another
jurisdiction is not precluded." 15 The Anti-Injunction Act purportedly
"prevent[ed] needless friction between state and federal courts."16
There are numerous exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. The statute
does not apply to in rem actions. Where a federal court has jurisdiction over
a specific piece of property, the exercise of jurisdiction of another court
over that same res necessarily interferes with the jurisdiction of the federal
court. 17 Furthermore, the basis for jurisdiction for an in rem proceeding
stems from control over the object in question, rather than from the
presence of a person within specific territorial limits. Two courts cannot
theoretically have in rem jurisdiction over the same piece of property.18
The Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to injunctions against matters
which are filed in state court after a federal court has reached a decision.
The Supreme Court differentiated the situation in Kline, which involved two
concurrently pending matters, from one where a court had already reached a
final judgment in one action. The court stated, "Whenever a judgment is
rendered in one of the courts and pleaded in the other, the effect of that
judgment is to be determined by the application of resjudicata [in the other
court]." 19 Thus, the Anti-Injunction Act applies only to actions in progress,
and a federal court can enjoin parties from relitigating future proceedings.
20
U.S. 281, 284 (1970) ("T]he reasons that led Congress to adopt this restriction on federal
courts are not wholly clear. ..
12 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
13 See id. at 235.
14 See id. at 227.
15 
Id. at 230.
16 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 211, 286
(1970) (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Gas Co.. 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940)).




20 Courts are split as to whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to state proceedings filed
after the commencement of a federal suit but before a court has ruled on an injunction. See
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Congress recognized the traditional in rem and relitigation exceptions in
its most recent amendments to the Act. After the Supreme Court overruled
the relitigation exception in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,2t
Congress modified the Anti-Injunction Act in 1948 to restore "the basic law
as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." 22 The
amended statute prohibits injunctions against state court proceedings except
"as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
[a court's] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate [a court's] judgments." 23
In short, although courts would hold the Anti-Injunction Act to be a bar to
federal court interference in state court proceedings, there have traditionally
been broad exceptions to that bar.
B. The "Act of Congress" Exception
The "Act of Congress" provision of the Anti-Injunction Act reflects
Congress' intention to allow statutory exceptions. Prior to 1940, courts had
recognized seven such exceptions to the Act: (1) bankruptcy proceedings,
(2) the removal of state based claims, (3) limitations on the liability of
shipowners, (4) federal interpleader actions, (5) farm mortgages, (6) habeus
corpus proceedings and (7) price controls. 24 Today, the Act of Congress
exception has been invoked in areas such as civil rights and antitrust
proceedings where Congress has preempted state action.
25
The Supreme Court defined what constitutes an "Act of Congress" in
Mitchum v. Foster.26 The City of Bay County, Florida, filed suit in state
court to enjoin a bookstore from selling pornography. 27 The state court
granted the injunction, and the bookstore owners filed a claim in federal
court under 41 U.S.C. section 1983 (authorizing a suit in equity to redress a
state intrusion on one's constitutional rights) alleging that the state court
generally 17 CHARLEs A. WRitrr Er AL., FEDERAL PRACICME AND PROCEDURE § 4222
(1988).
21 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
22 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th
Cong., A181-182 (1947)).
23 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
24 See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 234-235.
25 See id. at 242-243 (declaring civil rights statute to fall within the Act of Congress
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 623-
624 (1977) (divided court reversing lower court's decision holding that the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1994), falls within the Act of Congress exception to the Anti-Injunction Act),
cla ficatlon denied, 434 U.S. 425 (1978), and cerr. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
26 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
27 See id. at 227.
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action deprived him of rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 28 After convening a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
sections 2281 and 2284, the court refused to enjoin the state court
proceeding because of the Anti-Injunction Act. 29 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's decision, holding that 42 U.S.C. section 1983
fell within the Act of Congress exception to the Act.30 In deciding what
legislation constituted an Act of Congress the Court considered "whether
... a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could
be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."
31
Several commentators have argued that Federal Rules can accord
equitable remedies that fall within the Act of Congress exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act.32 Although courts have held that a rule of civil
procedure does not create a right or remedy enforceable in a court of
equity,3 3 decisions by the Third Circuit imply that the court would allow an
injunction to be brought under the exception.
34
In In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation,35 purchasers of
distributorships and franchises from Glenn Turner filed claims in a federal
district court alleging that they had been defrauded by a pyramid scheme.
At the same time, the attorneys general of forty-one states brought parallel
actions in state courts against Mr. Turner. The federal district court later
allowed the attorneys general to intervene in the federal action provided that
they restrained their state court proceedings. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed a state court injunction against Turner, and the Kentucky
Attorney General moved to amend the federal district court's order.36 The
district court denied the motion, and the Third Circuit reversed.
3 7
The Third Circuit cited Mitchum and noted that Rule 23(b)(3), which
provides an "opt-out" mechanism for class members, could not be given its
"intended scope by the stay of a state court proceeding."3 8 In other words,
Rule 23(b)(3), by expressly allowing parallel proceedings to a federal class
28 See id.
29 See id. at 227-228.
3 0 See id. at 242-243.
31 Id. at 238.
32 See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507,
529 (1987) (citing Steven Larimore, Erploring the Interface Between Rule 23 Class Actions
and the Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 18 GA. L. REv. 259, 268 (1971)).
33 See id.
34 See In re Glenn W. Turner Enter. Litig., 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1975).
35 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1975).
36 See id. at 777-778.
37 See id. at 778.
38 Id. at 780-781 (quoting Mitchtun, 407 U.S. at 238 (1972)).
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action suit, would prohibit a federal court from issuing an injunction.
Conversely, Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2), which do not provide an opt-
out mechanism, can only achieve their intended objectives by restricting all
state court actions.
39
Courts have suggested that Rule 23 represents a clear intention on the
part of Congress to preempt state action. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in In re Asbestos School Litigation,40 noted that
the Supreme Court had modified its position regarding the "outcome
determinative test" of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins41 and would allow a
federal court to enjoin state proceedings in the context of a class action
dispute.42 Where a federal rule applies to a particular situation, "the court
has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only
if the Advisory Committee, this court, and Congress erred in their prima
faciejudgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." 43 The Third Circuit qualified
the district court decision by maintaining that federal courts should not
"bury" state actions under the "vast expense of a federal class action."
44
However, if Congress intended Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) to give
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over no-opt-out class action
proceedings, district courts must be able to issue injunctions.
While there is indirect support for allowing a court to issue an
injunction against state proceedings under the Act of Congress exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, no court has expressly stated that Rule 23 provides
an equitable remedy which meets the test outlined in Mitchum. Courts are
more likely to allow an injunction brought under the "in aid of jurisdiction"
and "to effectuatejudgments" exceptions discussed below.
45
C. The "In Aid of Jurisdiction" Exception
The "in aid of jurisdiction" provision of the Anti-Injunction Act
embodies the pre-1948 in rem exception to the Act.4 6 Courts continue to
39 See Sherman, supra note 32, at 531.
40 107 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1985). aff'd mem., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cell. denied,
479 U.S. 852 (1986).
41 304 U.S. 64 (1948).
42 See In re Abestos Sch. Litg., 107 F.R.D. at 226.
43 Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)), aff'd in pall, 789 F.2d
996 (3d Cir. 1986).
44 In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1986).
45 See discussion infra Parts 11.B. and II.C.
4 6 See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ErAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4225
(1988).
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respect the notion that two courts cannot have concurrent jurisdiction over
the same res. Courts have expanded their interpretation of the concept to
include in personam cases where "relief may be necessary to prevent a state
court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition
of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority
to decide that case."
47
Most courts will not issue an injunction merely because a judgment in
one court may impair the ability of a party in another court to collect
damages. In In re Federal Skywalk Cases,48 the Eighth Circuit rejected the
argument that a corporation's assets should be treated as a res, giving the
court exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.49 In 1981, two skywalks in the
central lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City collapsed, killing
114 people and injuring others. Victims filed class action claims for
compensatory and exemplary damages in both state and federal courts. One
of the parties in federal court moved to enjoin the state court action out of
the concern that there would be inadequate funds to satisfy a judgment in
his favor.50 The district court granted the injunction, but the Eighth Circuit
reversed, concluding that "the class has an uncertain claim for punitive
damages against defendants who have not conceded liability."
51
Other courts have not always followed the Skywalk decision. The Fifth
Circuit approved an injunction against state courts in In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation.52 Purchasers of corrugated containers filed a
price-fixing claim against manufacturers. After certifying the class,
53
several of the plaintiffs filed a parallel action in state court claiming a
violation of state antitrust laws. 54 The district court enjoined the plaintiffs
from continuing the state claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 55 The circuit
court held that state proceedings would interfere with the federal court's
ability to approve any settlement.
56
47 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295
1975).
48 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
49 See id. at 1182-1183.
50 See id. at 1177-1178.
51 Id. at 1182.
52 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982).
53 See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244, 245 (S.D. Tex.
1978), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981).
54 See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
5 5 See id. at 1336.
56 See id. at 1335.
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Drawing on Corrugated Container,57 the Second Circuit, in In re
Baldwin-United Corp.,58 held that a court may grant an injunction in a class
action proceeding when settlement is imminent. In that case, the holders of
Baldwin single-premium deferred annuities filed claims against brokers
alleging violations of securities laws. Negotiations led to settlements by a
majority of the brokers. State attorneys general concluded that claimants
were not adequately represented and commenced state administrative
proceedings. In return for a higher settlement, the attorneys general offered
to end their efforts.5 9 The district court issued an injunction against the state
court proceedings and the Second Circuit affirmed. 6° While recognizing that
courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over in personam proceedings, the
court compared the settlement process to in rem actions. 61 The court held,
"it is intolerable to have conflicting orders from different courts." 62 The
court stated that the parallel actions were "harassing" and "frustrated efforts
to craft a settlement. " 63
The Third Circuit approved the use of an injunction against state
proceedings in Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc.64 A group of asbestos
victims filed personal injury claims against manufacturers. The parties
reached a proposed settlement, but the court had to stay settlement hearings
in order to consider the effect of a parallel action filed in Virginia state
courts. The district court granted an injunction against the state
proceedings. 65 The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the trend to approve an
injunction in cases where "the existence of actions in [the] state court
jeopardizes its ability to rule on the settlements." 66
Despite significant precedent taking advantage of the in aid of
jurisdiction exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, it does not necessarily
follow that courts will stay state court proceedings in no-opt-out class action
situations under Rule 23(b)(1). Previous rulings involved Rule 23(b)(3)
certifications67 or hybrid actions involving Rule 23(b)(3) certifications for
57 659 P.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981).
58 See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985).
59 See Id. at 331-333.
60 See Id. at 341-342.
61 See Id. at 335 (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922)).
62 1d. at 336 (quoting 17 CHAPLES A. WRGcHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4225 at 105 n.8 (Supp. 1985)).
63 Baldwin-Unfted Corp., 770 F.2d at 337.
64 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993).
6S See Id. at 193-194.
66 Id. at 203 (quoting Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d at 333).
67 See generally Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993);
Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328; Corrugated Container, 643 F.2d 195.
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compensatory damages and Rule 23(b)(1) certifications for punitive
damages.
68
Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York issued an
injunction against state proceedings which interfered with the settlement of
a no-opt-out class action. 69 In In re Joint Eastern and Southern District
Asbestos Litigation,70 a manufacturer of asbestos products sought an
alternative to bankruptcy by moving for certification of a class pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 71 A court-appointed expert reviewed the financial
condition of the manufacturer and verified that there was "a substantial
probability that claims of earlier litigants would exhaust [the company's
assets]." 72 The judge conditionally approved the class certification and
issued an injunction against other pending state proceedings.
73
Judge Weinstein noted that not only would the defendant likely go
bankrupt if the court allowed parallel proceedings, but all of the victims
might not receive the same treatment. 74 Reiterating the reasoning found in
cases considering actions under Rule 23(b)(3), the judge compared the
limited fund available to potential claimants to a res which could effectively
be under the jurisdiction of only one court.75 The court concluded by
criticizing Skywalk and maintaining that the necessary in aid of jurisdiction
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act justifies a stay of state proceedings.
76
68 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re Sch. Asbestos Litg., 789 F.2d 996, 998 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986). The court in School Asbestos approved an injunction against
state proceedings; however, the court decertified the class under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
See id. at 1007, 1011.
69 134 F.R.D. 32, 37-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
70 Id.
71 See id. at 34.
72 id. at 34-35.
73 See id. at 35.
74 See id. at 33-34.
75 See id. at 37-38.
76 See In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32, 37-40 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (citing In re Dennis Greenman See. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1544 (1 Ith Cir. 1987)
(finding "the [Anti-Injuction Act] not a bar to class certification"); In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1192 (8h Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J. dissenting) ("It seems self-evident
that an injunction to protect the ordinary scope of a mandatory class action is 'necessary in aid
of' the federal jurisdiction over such a class."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re
Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 622 F. Supp. 1430, 1449 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds-, 829 F.2d 1539 (1 Ith Cir. 1987) (disagreeing with reasoning of Skywalk majority and
certifying class for settlement); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 436 (E.D. Pa.
1984), modified sub noi. on other grounds, In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.
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One might interpret In re School Asbestos Litigation77 as indicating that
the Third Circuit might not allow an injunction against state proceedings in
no-opt-out class situations. In School Asbestos, a group of school districts
filed claims against asbestos manufacturers. The district court certified a no-
opt-out class for punitive damages, but the Third Circuit reversed, stating
concerns regarding the Anti-Injunction Act.78 The court did not, however,
go as far as to say that it would never allow an injunction in a case
involving a mandatory class. The court stated that the district court had not
done adequate fact-finding to determine whether there was a limited fund
which might impair a recovery by future claimants. 79 Furthermore, the
court did not accept the "limited generosity theory," which holds that a
defendant should not have to pay repetitive punitive damage awards.
80
In circuits that have not considered whether to allow an injunction
against parallel proceedings for a class certified under Rule 23(b)(1), there
is a strong argument in favor of granting such an injunction. The arguments
for granting an injunction in opt-out and no-opt-out class actions are
essentially the same: parallel actions interfere with a court's ability to
approve a settlement agreement. Finally, an analogy to in rem actions is
even stronger where the court is dealing with a limited fund under Rule
23 (b)(1) (B).
1986); Robert C. Gordon, The Optimum Management of the Skywalks Mass Disaster
Litigation by Use of the Federal Mandatory Class Action Device, 52 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 215,
231-232 (1984) (noting that several articles have described the Eighth Circuit's decision as
"unreasonable," "untenable," "arcane," "obscure," "unnecessarily narrow" and
"inequitable"); Note, Class Certifcation In Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96
HARV. L. REy. 1143, 1159-1161 (1983) (stating certification of mandatory class comes within
"necessary in aid ofjurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injuction Act); Note, Mechanical and
Constitutional Problems in the Certification of Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions
Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517 (finding compelling reasons for conclusion that
'necessary in aid ofjurisdiction" exception allows mandatory class certification).
77 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
78 See id. at 998, 1002.
79 See id. at 1003 ("Because plaintiffs had presented no evidence that the defendant's
available assets would be insufficient to pay all claims, the district court did not rely on a
'limited fund' theory as a basis for class certification.").
80 See id. at 1003-1007.
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D. The "To Protect or Effectuate Judgments" Exception
1. Actually Litigated?
The Supreme Court has long recognized that matters decided regarding
a class in one suit may not be relitigated in a subsequent action. For
example, in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,81 beneficiaries of a
mortuary pre-need trust fund brought suit in federal court against a fraternal
benefit association regarding maintenance of trust fund proceeds and a
proposed reorganization of the association.82 The district court dismissed
the action, and the beneficiaries filed suit in an Indiana state court. 83 The
benefit association sought an injunction in federal court against the state
court proceeding. 84 The district court refused to grant the injunction for
want of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed.85
While only expressly ruling on jurisdictional issues, the Supreme Court
considered the resjudicata effect of the previous class action decision. 86 The
Court held that interests of efficiency in a class action proceeding
outweighed the right of individual claimants to have their day in court.87
The Court concluded that a "decree binds [all the members of a class] as if
all were before the court."8 8 The Court noted that had the situation been
reversed, the state court decision would have been binding on the federal
courts.89 The class action mechanism will not work if members are allowed
to contest a previous action in a subsequent proceeding. 90 The Court
observed, "[i]f [a] decree is to be effective and conflicting judgments are to
be avoided all of the class must be concluded by the decree." 91
The third exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, "to protect or effectuate
judgments," codified the pre-1948 exception for staying state court
proceedings to prevent relitigation of a previous federal court ruling.92
81 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
82 See id. at 360-361.
83 See id. at 361-362.
84 See id. at 362.
85 See id. at 362, 367.
86 See id. at 366-367.
87 See id. at 365-367.
88 Id. at 363 (quoting Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1850)).
89 See id. at 362.
90 See id. at 366-367.
91 Id. at 367.
92 See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT Lur AL., FEDERAL PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 4226
(1988). See generally 7A CHARLES A. WRIOHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1780 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
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However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon
Corp.,91 has caused some confusion as to how broadly courts should
interpret the exception. 94 Courts are divided as to whether the relitigation
exception applies to the same situations as did issue preclusion and claim
preclusion prior to Toucey or whether the exception applies only to matters
"actually decided." 95
In Chick Kam Choo, a Singapore resident was killed while working on
a ship, and the decedent's wife sued the owner in federal court. 96 The court
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the owner on the basis
that Singapore law governed the dispute and on forum non conveniens
grounds. 97 The widow then sued in state court, but the federal court issued
an injunction against the state proceeding. 98 The appellate court affirmed,
but the Supreme Court reversed, declaring that the district court's injunction
was unnecessarily broad.99
Although not expressly stated in the opinion, the underlying concern in
Chick Kam Choo was that the court would be predetermining the res
judicata effect of its judgment by the issuance of an injunction against future
proceedings.100 Claim preclusion and issue preclusion normally would
prevent relitigation of a matter already decided regardless of an injunction,
and the ability of a person to initiate a subsequent proceeding to determine
the merits of the res judicata defense complies with due process
requirements. On the other band, an injunction against a parallel state court
proceeding deprives a person of his day in court and may bind him to a
judgment where he did not have adequate representation. The due process
concern is even more acute in class action situations where a person is
9 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
94 See 18 CHARLES A. W~iUHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACtnCE AND PROCEDURE § 4414
(1981).
9 5 see 17 CHARLES A. WRIOHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4226, at
202 n.12.1 (Supp. 1996).
96 Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 142.
97 See id. at 202-204 (citing Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994)); LCS Sere. Inc. v. Hamrick, 925 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1991);
Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1989); see also In re Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., MDL No. 849, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9236, at *16 (E.D. Pa. July 5,
1994).
98 See Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 143-144.
99 See Id. at 144-145, 151.
'00 See Id. at 147-148.
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supposedly guaranteed the opportunity to question the validity of class
certification in later proceedings.
101
The "actually decided" requirement of Chick Kam Choo restrains the
power of a court to issue an injunction by adopting a stricter standard than
that involving claim preclusion. Claim preclusion would normally prevent
relitigation between two parties of any matters regarding a common nucleus
of operative fact, whether or not the issue was actually decided in a
previous suit. 102 The "actually decided" exception applies only to issue
preclusion where a nonparty to a previous action tries to enforce a previous
decision against a party to that action.103 Although not prohibiting
injunctions against state proceedings altogether, Chick Kam Choo crafted a
hybrid standard based on issue preclusion and claim preclusion in order to
restrict the power of federal courts to predetermine the res judicata effect of
their decisions.
104
Professors Wright and Miller argue that applying the actually decided
test to situations involving claim preclusion is "unduly restrictive." 105 The
professors maintain, "[tihe Chick Kam Choo opinion is ambiguous and does
not show that a distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion
was really considered or intended." 106 Whether or not the professors'
interpretation is correct, many courts seem to have adopted the actually
decided requirement.10 7 The professors cite only one circuit court which has
given Chick Kam Choo a broader reading. 10
In summary, there is a split of opinion concerning the meaning of Chick
Kam Choo. Although there is ample evidence to support an interpretation of
the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act as understood prior to
101 See generally 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1779 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
102 See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4414
(1981).
103 See id. § 4416.
104 See Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146-148.
105 17 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4226, at
202 n.12.1 (Supp. 1996).
106,id.
107 See id. at 202-204 (citing Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994)); LCS Serv. Inc. v. Hamrick, 925 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1991);
Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1989); see also In re Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., MDL No. 849, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9236, at *16 (E.D. Pa. July 5,
1994).
108 See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4226,
at 202 n.12.1 (Supp. 1996) (citing Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1050 (1993)).
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the 1948 amendments, many courts have adopted an actually decided
requirement to issue an injunction. In any case, a settlement decree
constitutes a final judgment, and a court should interpret the settlement's res
judicata effect according to the intent of the parties.'0
9
2. No-Opt-Out Class Action Disputes
Decisions involving no-opt-out class action disputes have been
contradictory or inconclusive at best. In Grimes v. Vitalink Communications
Corp.," ° the Third Circuit enforced a state-approved settlement decree
involving a no-opt-out class action.111 In Grimes, shareholders of Vitalink
Communications filed actions in California and Delaware contesting a
merger between Vitalink and Network Systems Corporation. 12 The
plaintiffs in both states stipulated to a settlement agreement, the Delaware
court certified the settlement class under Court of Chancery Rules 23(b)(1)
and 23(b)(2), 1 3 and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.
114
Prior to the Supreme Court's denial of review, shareholders filed suit in
federal court alleging breach of federal securities laws. 115 The district court
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Vitalink because the
state court settlement barred all future claims, and the United States
Constitution" 6 and the Full Faith and Credit Act 1 7 required that the court
respect state decisions. 118 The Third Circuit upheld the lower court decision
finding no due process violation and approving the broad preclusive effect
of the settlement agreement.1 19
Despite the fact that Grimes treats whether a federal court should view
a broad state-approved settlement agreement as res judicata, the Third
Circuit relied on cases involving federal injunctions of state court
109 See 18 CHARLES A. WRiaHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4443
(1981).
110 17 F.3d 1553 Cd Cir. 1994), cerr. denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994).
III See id. at 1561.
112 See id. at 1554.
113 DEL. R. ANN. RULE23. The Court of Chancery Rule 23 is "virtually identical" to
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1555 n.2.
114 Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1554-1555.
115 See id. at 1556.
116 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
117 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
118 See Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1556 n.4.
119 See id. at 1564.
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proceedings. 120 Although the circuit court cited these cases for the
proposition that a federal court may approve a settlement agreement
precluding relitigation of state based claims, two of the cases deal
specifically with granting an injunction "to protect and effectuate
judgments."121 In Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle,122 the court granted an
injunction under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act at the
same time it approved a settlement agreement. 23 In In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation,124 the court granted an injunction against
state proceedings shortly after approval of a settlement agreement. 12 5 The
Third Circuit concluded in Grimes that enforcing the preclusive effect of a
settlement agreement served the "important policy interest of judicial
economy. "126
The Second Circuit has come out squarely in favor of allowing
injunctions in mandatory class situations. In In re "Agent Orange" Product
Liability Litigation, 127  veterans from the Vietnam War sued the
manufacturers of the defoliant Agent Orange. 128 The claims were
consolidated in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
under Judge Weinstein. 129 The court certified a class with opt-out rights for
compensatory damages and a limited fund, no-opt-out class for punitive
damages.' 30 The court granted summary judgment against the opt-out
plaintiffs and approved a broad settlement agreement including "persons
who have not yet manifested injury."13' Subsequently, two class action
proceedings were filed in state court. 132 A federal court allowed removal of
the claims and transferred them to the Eastern District of New York. 133 The
120 See id. at 1563 (citing Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1297-1288
(th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litg., 643 F.2d 195, 221-222 (5th Cir. 1981), cet. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982)).
121 Class Plaintiffs, 955 F.2d at 1287-1290; Corrugated Container, 643 F.2d at 221-
222.
122 Class Plaintiffs, 955 F.2d at 1268.
123 See id. at 1279.
124 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1981).
125 See id. at 1334-1336.
126 Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1563 (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675
F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1992)).
127 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994).
128 See id. at 1428.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 1429.
132 See id. at 1430.
133 See id.
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district court dismissed the claims as barred by the previous settlement and
issued an injunction against the filing of future claims by class members.
134
The circuit court approved the decision.1
35
In considering whether removal of the cases violated the Anti-
Injunction Act, the court concluded that the action fell within the "necessary
in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Act. 136 The court emphasized that
the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the case in order to
oversee the disbursement of funds under the settlement agreement. 137 The
court held, "[i]n a class action, the district court has a duty to class
members to see that any settlement it approves is completed, and not merely
to approve a promise." 138 The court pointed out that the settlement included
"persons who have not yet manifested injury" and precluded all relitigation
of claims.
139
In summary, the Anti-Injunction Act would seem to allow courts to stay
parallel proceedings to aid in the settlement of a class action dispute.
Although 'commentators have suggested that the Federal Rules can accord
equitable remedies which would preempt state action, no federal court has
ever declared Rule 23 to fall within the "Act of Congress" exceptionl4' to
the Anti-Injunction Act.141
On the other hand, there is growing support for allowing injunctions
under the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" and "to protect or effectuate
judgments" exceptions. Some circuits would likely stay court proceedings
in a mandatory class situation or where a company is on the verge of
bankruptcy. Without a clear decision on the part of the Supreme Court,
however, efforts at settlement in mass tort situations will be difficult.
I. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
A. The Minimum Contacts Requirement
While the Supreme Court has developed substantial jurisprudence
regarding a defendant's due process rights, it has largely ignored the
134 See id.
13S See id. at 1439.
136 Id. at 1431.
13 7 See id. at 1432.
138 rd. (citing In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 752 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985)).
139 id.
140 See discussion infra part H.B.
141 See discussion infra part il.C. and HI.D.
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parallel question of what safeguards a court must accord a plaintiff.142
Generally, a plaintiff consents to the jurisdiction of a particular forum when
the plaintiff initiates an action. 143 Courts have only considered a defendant's
due process rights since the defendant is the only one likely to object.
144
The United States Supreme Court considered a plaintiffs due process
rights for the first time in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation.145 The Court held that a foreign plaintiff state may assert
jurisdiction over a defendant who has substantial contacts with a forum but
maintains its principal place of business elsewhere. 146 A foreign corporation
owning mines in the Philippines moved much of its management activities
to Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the islands during the Second
World War. 147 A non-Ohio citizen served summons on the president of the
corporation in Ohio regarding a matter which arose outside of the state.
148
The Ohio Supreme Court quashed the summons, but the Supreme Court
reversed the decision, holding that a state may assert jurisdiction over a
defendant who has substantial and continuous contacts with the forum. 149
The Court largely ignored the citizenship of the plaintiff and concentrated
on the "overall fairness" to the defendant and maintained that a person who
does substantial business in a forum should be amenable to suit there. 15
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.151 and Hanson v.
Denkla,152 the United States Supreme Court indirectly considered the rights
of a plaintiff by gauging a state's "manifest interest" in adjudicating a
matter by the plaintiffs contact with a forum.' 53 In McGee, a nonresident
defendant sold an insurance agreement to a resident of California and later
refused to honor a claim by the insured. 154 Noting the interest California
142 See Linda S. Mullenix, Symposhm, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and
Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Class Actions, Personal Juisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due
Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 871, 887-890 (1995).
143 See id.
144 See id.
'45 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
146 See id. at 444-447.
147 See id. at 447.
148 See id. at 438, 446.
149 See id. at 438,445,449.
150 See id. at 444-447.
151 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
152 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
153 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-255; McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-224.
154 See McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-222.
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had in providing effective redress for its residents, the Supreme Court
upheld California's assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign party.15 5
The Supreme Court reached the opposite result in Hanson, however,
when it held that Delaware did not have to give full faith and credit to a
Florida decision regarding the status of a will because Florida did not have
jurisdiction over an "indispensable party" to the action, a Delaware trust
company.15 6 The Supreme Court held that Florida's interest in the matter
did not rise to the same level of importance as that of California in
McGee.15 7 Furthermore, the suit did not arise from "a privilege the
defendant exercised in Florida." 158 The Court held that despite a number of
contacts with Florida, a party must "purposely avail" himself of a particular
forum to be amenable to suit there.159 Taken together, McGee and Hanson
suggest that although a plaintiff's interest should be a factor in determining
whether jurisdiction is proper, a forum cannot acquire jurisdiction
automatically by being the place where most of the events in a particular
matter took place.
The Supreme Court stated that a court should consider a plaintiff's
interest as one factor among many in determining whether a defendant
should be subject to jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson.160 Drivers of a Volkswagen car were involved in an accident
while on vacation in Oklahoma and instituted a products liability suit
against both the New York automobile retailer and wholesaler. 161 The
retailer and wholesaler appealed, claiming that it was unreasonable for
Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction over them because they did no business in
that state. 162 The Court recognized that a plaintiff had a strong interest in
"obtaining convenient and effective relief."1 63 However, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that defendants should be liable for any "foreseeable" acts
arising out of the sale of their products. 164 Drawing on the "purposeful
availment test" used in Hanson, the Court held that only forums where
defendants "deliver[ed] [their] products into the stream of commerce with
155 See id. at 223-224.
156 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254-255.
157 See id. at 252-253.
15 8 Id. at 252.
159 See id. at 253.
160 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
161 See id. at 288.
16 2 See id. at 288-290.
163 Id. at 292.
164 See id. at 295-298.
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the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers" 165 could assert
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has been much more willing to overlook a
defendant's minimum contacts with a forum state and give more weight to a
plaintiff's interests where the matter in question arises directly out of a
defendant's contacts with a forum. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
166
the defendant distributed pornographic material in Maine which libeled the
plaintiff.' 67 The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over the magazine,
holding that it had actively marketed its goods in Maine and should have
expected such a cause of action. 168 Despite the fact that the plaintiff had
engaged in blatant forum-shopping, 169 the Court held that it had never
required plaintiffs to have minimum contacts with a particular forum.
170
In summary, the Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff's due process
rights are a non-issue except in the context of evaluating the due process
rights of a defendant. The Supreme Court has considered the interest of a
plaintiff indirectly and has gone as far as to say that it should be a factor in
deciding whether to allow jurisdiction over a defendant. A plaintiff's
interests are given considerable weight where the defendant's contact with a
forum directly relates to a cause of action, but, in the end, a plaintiff's right
to chose a particular forum to redress his grievances will never overshadow
the rights of a defendant.
B. Due Process in Opt-Out Class Action Suits
The recent explosion of class action litigation has prompted courts to
take a new look at plaintiffs' due process rights. Defendants have sought to
challenge the validity of a class certification by objecting to the procedure
used to notify absent class members. 171 Plaintiffs have objected to inclusion
in a class when they wish to pursue their own private right of action.
Class action suits by their very nature must entail some exception to in
personamjurisdiction.1 72 Class action suits are an invention of equity courts
to enable actions to proceed where the interests of the participants are so
similar that it does not make sense to pursue separate actions, but the usual
165 Id. at 297-298.
166 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
16 7 See id.
168 See id. at 779-781.
169 Maine was the last state in which the statute of limitations had not run.
170 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-780.
171 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 800 (1985).
172 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-43 (1940).
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process of joinder would be impracticable. 173 The United States Supreme
Court has held that there is no due process violation for absent members
when "they are in fact adequately represented by the parties who are present
".174
Although the due process jurisprudence regarding in personam
jurisdiction developed separately from that involving class action disputes,
the Supreme Court has used similar language in evaluating the two
situations. In Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme Court stated, "[Tihis Court is
justified in saying that there has been a failure of due process only in those
cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the
protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it." 175
As in cases involving in personam jurisdiction, the Court would consider
the facts of each case individually, weighing a myriad of factors in order to
determine whether there has been a constitutional violation. In both types of
disputes the main object is mainly one of "fundamental fairness."
In Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,176 the Court considered what type of
notice requirements had to be given to absent plaintiffs in an opt-out class
situation. 177 Individuals who owned royalty rights from the sale of natural
gas brought suit against producers. 178 The state trial court certified a class
of 33,000 royalty owners. The class representative provided notice to absent
class members by first-class mail and gave each person the right to opt-out
of the class. 179 Despite the fact that ninety-nine percent of the leases and
ninety-seven percent of the royalty owners had no connection with the
forum state, the Supreme Court found that the notice and opt-out procedures
did not violate the plaintiffs' due process rights and held the state decision
as resjudicata with respect to any future claims.180
In Shutts, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs' due process rights in a
class action deserved more attention than in a suit brought in personam, but
maintained that their rights did not face the same threat of abuse as those of
defendants in non-class civil suits. 181 The Court noted that the requirements
of Hansbeny already provided a certain level of protection for the
plaintiff.182 In addition, the Supreme Court asserted that a class action
173 See id. at 41-42.
1 74 Id. at 42-43.
175 Id. at 42.
176 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
177 See id. at 806.
178 See Id. at 799.
179 See id. at 801.
1 8 0 See Id. at 814.
181 See id. at 812.
182 See id. at 808.
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plaintiff must be given adequate notice' 83 and an opportunity to opt-out of
an action.1
8 4
The Court cautioned against "confusing" the predicament of a non-class
defendant with that of a class plaintiff.185 The Court rejected the
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtonl86 line of cases. Unlike a defendant
who may be forced to defend an action far away from his primary place of
residence,187 a class plaintiff may "sit back and allow the litigation to run
its course.... "18 8 The Supreme Court noted that in many cases a plaintiff
would not be able to bring an action on his own and benefited greatly from
the class action device.189 Although the Court recognized that a class
plaintiff may be bound by an adverse judgment foreclosing any individual
suit,190 the Supreme Court maintained that the procedural safeguards it had
established more than protected the interests of an absent plaintiff.191 The
plaintiff would have adequate counsel, his interests would have to be
identical to the class representative and he could always pursue a separate
individual action if he so desired.
The Supreme Court carefully delineated the scope of its decision. The
Court stated that its holding addressed only claims wholly or predominantly
for money damages. 192 The Court refused to make any statement regarding
suits seeking equitable relief.193 The Court's decision applies only to non-
mandatory class situations 194 and did not state whether similar procedures
should apply to a federal court.
In short, the Supreme Court has shown little concern for the due
process rights of plaintiffs in both in personam cases and class action
disputes. There is some sense that the plaintiff is master of his own destiny,
and procedural mechanisms already in place provide adequate protection.
183 See id. at 812 (stating that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections") (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-315 (1950)).
184 See id. at 812.
185 See id.
186 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
187 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807.
188 Id. at 810.
189 See id. at 809.
190 See id. at 807.
191 See id. at 811.
19? See id. at 811-812 n.3.
193 See id.
194 See id. at 814-815.
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The question remains, however, whether the Supreme Court will apply the
same type of reasoning to mandatory class situations.
C. Due Process Concerns in Mandatory Class Situations
Despite the Supreme Court's insistence that class action plaintiffs do
not face the same problems as non-class defendants,19 5 many courts continue
to apply the traditional "minimum contacts" test in deciding whether to
assert jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs in a class certified under Rules
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2). 196 Courts have also refused to enforce injunctions
against future proceedings for similar reasons. 197 A mandatory class is only
effective if all potential plaintiffs are included in an action and the court's
decision is res judicata with respect to all future claims. Without such
certainty the mandatory class differs very little from the opt-out class. The
disparity of court opinions has eviscerated the no-opt-out class mechanism.
The problems posed by differing interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment with respect to absent plaintiffs in a mandatory class are
illustrated in Brown v. 7Pcor Insurance Co.198 Twelve class actions were
filed in five federal courts in four states alleging price fixing by various title
insurance companies.' 99 The actions were consolidated in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and the Third Circuit issued an injunction against
all future claims and approved a settlement agreement decree with a no-opt-
out provision. 2°0 The Arizona and Wisconsin attorneys general then filed
new complaints in Arizona state and federal district courts on behalf of state
school districts seeking damages from the same defendants. 201 The Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an injunction
against the Arizona proceeding, but the Third Circuit reversed. The Ninth
Circuit refused to dismiss the complaint for similar reasons.
202
In general, courts that refuse to grant an injunction against parallel
proceedings interpret Shutts as guaranteeing an automatic right to opt-out in
195 See Id. at 808-815.
196 See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1179-1180 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
197 See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions afier Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE iJ. 1, 45-47 (1986).
198 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 56 (1993). cen. dismissed
per curiam, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994).
199 See id. at 388.
200 See id.
201 See id.
2 02 See id. at 388-391.
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any class action claim seeking monetary damages. 203 In Ticor, the Third
Circuit held that if a class member had "not been given the opportunity to
opt-out in a class action involving both important injunctive relief and
damage claims, then the class members must have either minimum contacts
with the forum or consent to jurisdiction in order to be enjoined by the
district court that entertained the class action." 204 The Third Circuit
interpreted the right to opt-out as being mandatory in a class action
setting.205 Absent such an opportunity, due process guidelines applying to
non-class civil defendants would also apply to all class action plaintiffs
whether certified under Rules 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3).
20 6
Other courts have recognized, however, that one cannot resolve many
mass tort cases without certifying a mandatory class. In In re DES Cases,
20 7
women who developed cancer from DES, a synthetic estrogen taken during
pregnancy, sued several pharmaceutical manufacturers who had sold the
drug. 20 8 Judge Weinstein wrote a lengthy decision in favor of doing away
with traditional due process requirements in the class action context.
Weinstein particularly focused on Keeton v. Hustler2°9 because in that case
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had substantial contacts with the
forum state, a situation which closely mirrors many class action disputes.210
The United States Supreme Court downplayed the traditional minimum
contacts test and instead focused on balancing the interests of the plaintiffs
against the fairness of subjecting the defendants to jurisdiction by a
particular court. 211 Pointing out that the Supreme Court had recognized in
Shutts that the minimum contacts requirements were unworkable in a class
action situation,212 Weinstein suggested using an "interest nexus" test
instead of a "territorial nexus" test.213 Judge Weinstein maintained that the
203 Courts will, however, uphold an injunction against future proceedings seeking
equitable relief. See Silber v. Mahon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Temple, 851
F.2d 1269, 1271-1272 (1lth Cir. 1988).
204 7lcor, 982 F.2d at 388 (quoting In re Real Estate and Settlement Servs. Antitrust
Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 769 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821 (1989)).
205 See id. at 389.
206 Cf. Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.2d 1553, 1560-1561 (3d Cir.
1994) (implying that the court would allow injunctions against future proceedings in a
mandatory class situation).
207 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
2 0 8 See id. at 558.
209 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
210 See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 574-575 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
211 See id.
212 See id. at 576.
213 See id. at 579-589.
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question should be why a forum with some requisite interest in entertaining
a particular suit should be allowed to take an action rather than why it
should not be allowed to take an action. 214 The presumption should be in
favor of allowing a forum to hear a dispute unless a party can show
substantial unfairness.
21 5
Although in DES Cases Judge Weinstein dealt largely with the question
of jurisdiction over defendants in a class action suit, his argument applies
equally to the due process rights of absent plaintiffs in a no-opt-out case.
For example, in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
2 16
Judge Weinstein upheld the certification of a mandatory class by holding,
"[S]ociety's interest in efficient and fair resolution of large-scale litigation
outweighs the gains from individual notice and opt-out rights, whose
benefits here are conjectural at best."217 In some situations, a no-opt-out
class is the only feasible way of dealing with a mass tort situation. Courts
are able to administer relief fairly to a large number of people. Companies
can pay out settlement funds assured that they will not be forced into
bankruptcy by an endless onslaught of future claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The settlement of large class action disputes cannot proceed unless
courts are free to stay parallel state proceedings and certify no-opt-out
classes. The Anti-Injunction Act and Fourteenth Amendment present
procedural barriers that hinder the ability of courts to administer
settlements.
Although many courts have viewed the Anti-Injunction Act as an
absolute bar to injunctions against state proceedings, there have been broad
exceptions to that bar. No court has ever declared Rule 23 to fall within the
"Act of Congress" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but precedent
exists for issuing an injunction under the "in aid of jurisdiction" and "to
protect or effectuate judgments" exceptions.
Courts have confused plaintiffs' due process concerns with those of
defendants. In non-class civil suits, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that a plaintiff has few due process rights. While there is
some concern for the rights of absent plaintiffs in a class action dispute,
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts allows courts to bind all plaintiffs in an opt-out
situation. Given the pressing need to bind all plaintiffs in mass tort cases,
214 See id. at 585 (citing Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1134 (1981)).
215 See id.
216 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993).
2 17 Id. at 1435.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 12:2 1997]
the Supreme Court should also declare actions under Rules 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(2) constitutional.
